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The European Union Terrorism Situation and
Trend Report, better known as the TE-SAT, aims
to provide law enforcement officials, policymak-
ers and the general public with a fact-based
understanding with regard to terrorism in the
European Union (EU). In addition to the presen-
tation of facts, it seeks to identify trends in the
development of this phenomenon.
The TE-SAT is a public report produced annual-
ly by Europol on the basis of information pro-
vided and verified by the competent law-
enforcement authorities in the member states
of the EU. In this respect, it is an awareness and
reference document for anyone interested in
the development of terrorism and related phe-
nomena in the EU. The TE-SAT reports are avail-
able on the Internet at Europol’s website
(http://www.europol.europa.eu).
Terrorists aim at intimidating the people, com-
pelling states to comply with their demands,
or destabilising or destroying the fundamental
political, constitutional, economic or social
structures of a country or an organisation.
Terrorism is the attempt to achieve political
goals with the use or the threat of violence.
In the EU, groups of people of very different
orientation continue to rely on terrorism as a
tactic. But terrorist acts and activities on the ter-
ritory of the EU can also be triggered by devel-
opments in other parts of the world.
Terrorism continues to impact on the lives of EU
citizens, both inside and outside of the EU. In
2008, four people, including a law enforcement
officer, died in the EU as a result of terrorist
attacks that were carried out by ETA in Spain.
I wish to extend special thanks to the member
states and Eurojust for their continuing contri-
butions of both quantitative and qualitative
data, which are essential to the annual produc-
tion of the TE-SAT.
Finally, I would like to thank all members of
the Advisory Board, consisting of the ‘Troika’
(EU Council Presidencies of France, the Czech
Republic and Sweden), Head of Europol National
Units, Eurojust and the EU Joint Situation
Centre (SitCen), who have demonstrated,
throughout the year, their support and valuable
contributions to the 2009 version of the TE-SAT
project.
1. FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR
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2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The European Union Terrorism Situation and
Trend Report (TE-SAT) seeks to establish basic
facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks,
arrests and activities in the European Union
(EU). The TE-SAT is based mainly on information
contributed by the EU member states resulting
from criminal investigations into terrorist
offences. It summarises the nature and volume
of terrorism and related phenomena in the EU
by presenting facts and figures on terrorist
attacks and arrests, and describing trends iden-
tified over the period between 2006 and 2008.
To some member states the threat from Islamist
as well as ethno-nationalist and separatist terror-
ism remains high. However, the overall number
of terrorist attacks in all member states in 2008,
excluding the UK,1 decreased by 24 percent in
comparison to 2007. For 2008 seven member
states reported a total of 515 failed, foiled or suc-
cessfully perpetrated terrorist attacks. Thirteen
member states arrested a total of 1009 individu-
als for terrorism. The majority of arrests were car-
ried out on suspicion of membership of a terror-
ist organisation. Other reasons for arrest were
attack-related offences, propaganda, financing
of terrorism, facilitation and training.
Illegal sources for the funding of terrorism
appear to cover a wide range of criminal activ-
ities, spanning from fraud and counterfeit to
burglary, kidnapping and extortion. Islamist
and non-Islamist terrorist groups use different
methods of financing. Islamist groups generate
more money than non-Islamist terrorist groups.
The majority of the persons arrested on suspi-
cion of financing of Islamist terrorism were
involved in fraud. Regarding separatist and left-
wing terrorism, the majority of individuals ar-
rested on suspicion of financing of terrorism
were accused of extortion. The existence of
alternative remittance systems greatly faci-
litates avoiding detection when transferring
terrorism funds.
The use of the Internet has become pivotal in all
types of terrorism. It offers anonymity in the
exchange of information, making it easy for
these organisations to communicate and spread
propaganda.
The number of women arrested for terrorism-
related offences remains low. Nevertheless,
women play an important role as associates in
supporting terrorist organisations. The tasks
assigned to women in terrorist organisations dif-
fer from those of men. Women are more involved
in propaganda, facilitation, support and financial
activities, whereas men are more involved in
attack-related activities. The percentage of wo-
men among the arrested is lowest with Islamist
terrorism and highest with left-wing terrorism.
During 2008, 359 individuals were tried on ter-
rorism charges in the member states in a total of
187 proceedings. Of 384 verdicts which were
pronounced in 2008, 50 percent were related to
Islamist terrorism, and 39 percent to separatist
terrorism. The defendants were acquitted in 29
percent of the verdicts. Most, if not all, convic-
tions were related to terrorist offences that
occurred before 2008.
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1 The UK data for 2006 and 2007 is not comparable to that of 2008, due to the fact that the UK could not provide
Europol with comprehensive quantitative data for the TE-SAT 2009.
Islamist terrorism is still perceived as being the
biggest threat worldwide, despite the fact that
the EU only faced one Islamist terrorist attack in
2008. This bomb attack took place in the UK. The
number of arrests relating to Islamist terrorism
gives an indication of the amount of law
enforcement activities. The number of persons
associated with ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorist
groups is rising in the EU. The threat emanating
from Islamist terrorism inside the EU is linked, to
a certain extent, to the developments in conflict
zones and politically instable countries, such as
North Africa, the Sahel region, Iraq, Somalia,
Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, but also India.
Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to have replaced
Iraq as preferred destinations for volunteers
wishing to engage in armed conflict. EU–based
suspects continue providing logistical support
to Islamist terrorist groups and networks based
outside the EU.
Separatist terrorism remains the terrorism area
which affects the EU most. This includes Basque
separatist terrorism in Spain and France, and
Corsican separatist terrorism in France. The num-
ber of separatist terrorist attacks decreased from
532 in 2007 to 397 in 2008, a figure that is com-
parable to 2006. The vast majority of these ter-
rorist attacks were executed in France and Spain.
Past contacts between ETA and the FARC illus-
trate the fact that also separatist terrorist organ-
isations seek cooperation partners outside the
EU on the basis of common interests. In the UK,
dissident Irish republican groups, principally the
RIRA and the CIRA, and other paramilitary groups
may continue to engage in crime and violence.
The total number of left-wing terrorist attacks in
the EU has risen in 2008. Left-wing and anarchist
groups were responsible for 28 attacks; 58 indi-
viduals were arrested during 2008. In Greece, the
use of violence by the Epanastatikos Agonas or
Revolutionary Struggle has escalated and has the
potential for further escalation.
Right-wing terrorist attacks were not reported
in 2008. The majority of member states con-
sider these activities as right-wing extremism.
Several arrested right-wing extremists were
acting individually and were not linked to an
organisation.
Animal rights extremists dominated the illegal
activities of single issue extremism.
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3. TE-SAT 2009: INTRODUCTION 
AND METHODOLOGY
The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
(TE-SAT) was established in the aftermath of the
11 September 2001 attacks in the United States
of America as a reporting mechanism from the
Terrorism Working Party (TWP) of the Council of
the EU to the European Parliament. The contents
of the TE-SAT reports are based on information
supplied by the member states of the EU and
information drawn from open sources.
In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06),
the TE-SAT is produced annually to provide an
overview of the phenomenon of terrorism in the
EU from a law enforcement perspective. It seeks
to establish basic facts and figures regarding
terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU. The report
also aims at presenting trends that can be
deduced from the information available.
The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes
and analyses the outward manifestations of
terrorism, i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It
neither attempts to analyse the root causes of
terrorism nor to assess the threat posed by ter-
rorism.
Furthermore, the TE-SAT does not assess the
impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism
policies and law enforcement measures taken,
despite the fact that they form an important
part of the phenomenon.
The current methodology for producing the
report has been developed by Europol in 2006
in consultation with the Advisory Board, which
at the time included representatives of the
Finnish and German Presidencies of the EU
Council. It was endorsed by the Justice and
Home Affairs Council on 1 and 2 June 2006. This
edition of TE-SAT has been produced by Europol
in accordance with the 2009 Advisory Board,
composed of representatives of the present,
past and future EU Presidencies, i.e. the Czech
Republic, France and Sweden (the ‘Troika’), along
with SitCen (the EU Joint Situation Centre),2
Europol and Eurojust.
The TE-SAT is an unclassified document and
does not contain confidential information or
information that could jeopardise ongoing
investigations.
For the preparation of this report, Europol col-
lected qualitative and quantitative data on ter-
rorist offences in the EU and data on arrests of
people on suspicion of involvement in those
offences, provided or confirmed by member
states. Similar data were collected, when avail-
able, of offences in which EU interests were
affected outside of the EU. Eurojust has con-
tributed data on convictions and penalties for
terrorist offences in EU member states.
Included as ‘arrests’ are those judicial arrests
warranted by a prosecutor or investigating
judge, whereby a person is detained for ques-
tioning on suspicion of committing a criminal
offence for which detention is permitted by
national law. That the person may subsequently
be provisionally released or placed under house
arrest does not impact on the calculation of the
number of arrests.
TE-SAT
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2 SitCen monitors and assesses events and situations worldwide with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
What the term ‘terrorist offences’ include is indi-
cated in Article 1 of the Council Framework
Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terror-
ism (2002/475/JHA), which all member states
have implemented in their national legislation.3
This Framework Decision specifies that terrorist
offences are intentional acts which, given their
nature or context, may seriously damage a coun-
try or an international organisation when com-
mitted with the aim of 
• seriously intimidating a population, or
• unduly compelling a government or interna-
tional organisation to perform or abstain
from performing an act, or
• seriously destabilising or destroying the fun-
damental political, constitutional, economic
or social structures of a country or an inter-
national organisation.4
In cases in which the wording of Article 1 of the
Framework Decision leaves room for interpreta-
tion, the TE-SAT 2009 respects the member
states’ definitions of terrorist offences on their
territories. At times, it can be difficult to assess
whether a criminal event is to be regarded as an
act of ‘terrorism’ or as an act of ‘extremism’.
Contrary to terrorism, not all forms of extremism
sanction the use of violence. Nevertheless,
extremism as a phenomenon may be related to
terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural pat-
terns. Therefore, the TE-SAT 2009 mentions
criminal acts with the potential to seriously
destabilise or destroy the fundamental political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a
country, when they were reported by the mem-
ber states as extremism, in an effort to provide a
clearer picture of the phenomenon and its rela-
tion to terrorism. However, these cases were not
considered in the statistical data of this report,
which exclusively reflect incidents reported as
terrorism by the member states.
3.1. Types of terrorism
The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations
by their source of motivation. However, many
groups have a mixture of motivating ideologies,
although usually one ideology or motivation
dominates. The choice of categories used in the
TE-SAT reflects the current situation in the EU, as
reported by the member states. The categories
are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Islamist terrorism is perpetrated by individuals,
groups, networks or organisations which evoke
Islam to justify their actions.
Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups,
such as Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) or Basque
Fatherland and Liberty, seek international re-
cognition and political self-determination. They
are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or
religion.
Left-wing terrorist groups, such as the Devrimci
Halk Kurtulus¸ Partisi / Cephesi (DHKP-C) or Revo-
lutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front, seek to
change the entire political, social and economic
system of a state according to an extremist left-
ist model. Their ideology is often Marxist-
Leninist. The agenda of anarchist terrorist
groups is usually revolutionary, anti-capitalist
and anti-authoritarian. Not all member states
distinguish between activities of left-wing and
anarchist terrorist groups in their contributions.
For this reason, both categories are discussed in
the same chapter of this report.
Right-wing terrorist groups seek to change the
entire political, social and economic system on
an extremist right-wing model. The ideological
roots of European right-wing extremism and
terrorism can usually be traced back to National
Socialism.
Single issue terrorism is violence committed
with the desire to change a specific policy or
practice within a target society. The term is
generally used to describe animal rights and
environmentalist terrorist groups.
3.2. Data collection
For the TE-SAT 2009, terrorist activities are not
longer part of the quantitative data collection
but have moved to the qualitative data collec-
tion. This amendment of the methodology has
9
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3 See annex 3.
4 See annex 2.
been made in consultation with the Advisory
Board of the TE-SAT 2009.
As was the case for the 2007 and 2008 editions
of the TE-SAT, the UK was not able to provide
Europol with comprehensive quantitative data
for the TE-SAT 2009. Nevertheless, as for the TE-
SAT 2007 and 2008, the total number of attacks
and arrests under the UK Terrorism Act 2000
without specification of the type of terrorism
were contributed. For the TE-SAT 2009, the
arrests and attacks in Northern Ireland were
contributed for the first time, which resulted in a
higher total number of arrests and attacks in the
UK than in previous years.
The EU Council Decision on the exchange of infor-
mation and cooperation concerning terrorist
offences of 20 September 2005 (2005/671/JHA)
obliges the member states to collect all relevant
information concerning and resulting from crimi-
nal investigations conducted by their law enforce-
ment authorities with respect to terrorist offences
and sets out the conditions under which this
information should be sent to Europol. Europol
processed the data and the result was cross-
checked with the member states and, in case of
divergences or gaps, corrected and comple-
mented and then validated by the member
states.
Eurojust also collected data on the basis of the
aforementioned EU Council Decision, according
to which the member states are equally obliged
to collect all relevant information concerning
prosecutions and convictions for terrorist
offences and send it to Eurojust. Eurojust cross-
checked the collected data with the member
states and, in case of divergences or gaps, this
data was also corrected and complemented
and then validated. If convictions that took
place in 2008 were appealed but came to a con-
clusion before the end of the year, Eurojust
counted the proceedings as one. The arrests
and convictions may be related to terrorist
offences that took place before 2008 and, conse-
quently, may not be related to activities and
attacks referred to in the TE-SAT 2009.
Ten member states reported information on
concluded trials to Eurojust: Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, the Republic of Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
3.3. TE-SAT data analysis
The TE-SAT is both a situation and a trend re-
port. A trend can be defined as ‘a general ten-
dency in the way a situation is changing or
developing’. The TE-SAT 2009 presents a trend
analysis regarding the period 2006 to 2008.
Although the member states continue to report
on terrorist attacks and arrests in a varying
degree of elaboration, it can generally be stated
that the data contributed by the member states
for 2008 was of high quality. The analysis of the
quantitative data, however, was impaired by
the fact that the UK was not in the position to
produce statistics in similar detail as other mem-
ber states have done.
Gaps in the data collected by Europol may be
due to the fact that the investigations into the
terrorist attacks or activities concerned are still
ongoing. In addition, it is a well-known fact that
terrorist activities are not always prosecuted as
terrorist offences.
TE-SAT
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4. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
OF THE SITUATION IN THE EU 2008
4.1. Terrorist attacks
In 2008 seven member states reported a total of
515 failed, foiled or successfully perpetrated
attacks. For this edition of the TE-SAT, the number
11
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5 If the UK data is included, the total number of terrorist attacks in the EU still decreased by 12 percent from 2007
to 2008.
Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled or successful
attacks and number of arrested suspects
2006-2008
Key findings
■ During 2008, 515 terrorist attacks were 
carried out in the member states; 1009
individuals were arrested for terrorism-
related offences.
■ The majority of the suspects were arrested
for membership of a terrorist organisation.
■ Islamist and non-Islamist terrorist groups
use different methods of financing. Islamist
terrorist groups generate more money than
non-Islamist terrorist groups.
■ The number of women arrested for 
terrorism-related offences remains low
within the EU. Nevertheless, women play an
important role as associates in supporting
terrorist organisations.
■ Modern communication techniques are 
a facilitating factor for all types of terrorist
and extremist organisations. Several 
terrorist and extremist organisations run
their own websites in different languages.
■ During 2008, 359 individuals were tried 
on terrorism charges in the member states
in a total of 187 proceedings. Twenty-nine 
percent of the verdicts were acquittals.
of terrorist attacks reported by the UK included,
for the first time, terrorist attacks committed in
Northern Ireland. Therefore, this figure cannot be
compared to the previous years. For the rest of
the member states, the total number of attacks
decreased by 24 percent from 2007 to 2008.5 The
large majority of the attacks, i.e. 90 percent or
441 attacks, were carried out successfully. The
attacks were mostly arsons and bombings. Only
10 percent of the attacks were claimed, while two
thirds were attributed to a terrorist organisation.
With regard to Islamist terrorism, one attack was
reported by the UK.
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4.2. Arrested suspects
In 2008, 1009 individuals were arrested in the
member states for terrorism-related offences.
The number of arrests reported by the UK for
2008 included the arrests related to terrorism in
Northern Ireland, which were not included in
previous years. For this reason, no comparison
can be made. For the rest of the member states,
however, the total number of arrests decreased
by 11 percent from 2007 to 2008.7
An overview of all contributed attacks and
arrests for 2006, 2007 and 2008 can be found in
annexes 4 and 5.
The TE-SAT provides a separate overview for
each of the different types of terrorism. In this
general overview, differences or similarities of
these different types are pointed out.
The average age of the arrested suspects is 35
years.8 As in previous years, suspects arrested
for Islamist terrorism are older than those
arrested for separatist and left-wing terrorism.
The member states reported that individuals
involved in right-wing extremism are often
younger than 30.
The number of separatist terrorist attacks
decreased from 532 in 2007 to 397 in 2008, a fig-
ure that is comparable to 2006. The vast majori-
ty of these terrorist attacks were committed in
France and Spain. The overall number of report-
ed casualties and fatalities is limited. However,
four persons were killed in attacks by ETA in
2008.
Left-wing and anarchist groups were responsi-
ble for 28 attacks; 58 individuals were arrested
during 2008. In line with their national law, a
number of member states reported activities by
left-wing and anarchist groups as extremism
and not as terrorism.
No attacks classified as right-wing terrorism and
no arrests for right-wing terrorist offences were
recorded during 2008. All activities were report-
ed as right-wing extremism.
France reported five single issue terrorist
attacks for 2008 and three arrests related to
these attacks. Some member states reported
also on single issue activities. The majority of
these activities were linked to animal rights
extremism and environmental issues.
6 The UK provided Europol with information on a total number of 74 attacks in 2008, without specification of the
type of terrorism. Unlike previous editions of the TE-SAT, this number also includes attacks carried out in Northern
Ireland.
7 If the UK arrests are included, the total number of arrests in 2008 is still 4 percent lower than in 2007.
8 This calculation is based on data of 753 arrests in the member states, with the exception of the UK data.
Member State Islamist Separatist
Left 
Wing
Right 
Wing
Single 
Issue
Not 
Specified
Total 2008
Austria 0 5 0 0 0 1 6
France 0 137 0 0 5 5 147
Greece 0 0 13 0 0 1 14
Ireland (Republic of) 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
Italy 0 0 5 0 0 4 9
Spain 0 253 10 0 0 0 263
UK – – – – – – 74
Total 2008 0 397 28 0 5 11 515
Figure 2: Number of failed, foiled or successful attacks in 2008 per member state and per affiliation6
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The majority of arrests were carried out on sus-
picion of membership of a terrorist organisa-
tion. The activities of which the remainder of the
suspects were accused include attack-related
offences, propaganda, financing of terrorism,
facilitation and training.
4.3. Terrorist activities
Financing of terrorism
No terrorist activities can take place without the
availability of funds. All terrorist organisations
need to raise funds, regardless how small the
proceeds. Recent research at Europol, based on
contributions by several member states and on
data contributed for previous editions of the TE-
SAT, showed that Islamist and non-Islamist ter-
rorist groups use different methods of financing
and that Islamist groups generate more money
than non-Islamist groups.
Illegal sources for the funding of terrorism
appear to cover a wide range of criminal activi-
ties, spanning from fraud and counterfeit to bur-
glary, kidnapping and extortion. The majority of
the persons arrested on suspicion of financing of
Islamist terrorism were involved in fraud.
Regarding separatist and left-wing terrorism, the
majority of individuals arrested on suspicion of
financing of terrorism were accused of extortion.
Alongside criminal activities for funding, funds
are also derived from legitimate sources. Some
charitable organisations have proven to be vul-
nerable to being misused by individuals who mis-
appropriate voluntary contributions destined for
genuine purposes for terrorist purposes.The exis-
tence of alternative remittance systems helps
to avoid compliance with national and interna-
tional identification and notification regulations,
thereby allowing funds that have been generated
to be transferred from one country, in or outside
the EU, to another country and from one terrorist
cell to another without detection.These methods
are used frequently by Islamist terrorists.
Internet
Modern communication techniques are a facili-
tating factor for all types of terrorist and extrem-
ist organisations. High-speed Internet access,
new and low-cost communication tools, anony-
mity and a low level of regulation make it easy
for these organisations to communicate and
spread propaganda and, thus, are instrumental
Member State Islamist Separatist
Left 
Wing
Right 
Wing
Single 
Issue
Not 
Specified
Total 2008
Belgium 17 1 4 0 0 0 22
Cyprus 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Denmark 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
France 78 283 37 0 3 1 402
Germany 8 1 3 0 0 0 12
Ireland (Republic of) 3 49 0 0 0 0 52
Italy 9 35 7 0 0 2 53
Lithuania 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
Slovakia 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
Spain 61 129 6 0 0 1 197
Sweden 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
the Netherlands 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
UK - - - - - - 256
Total 2008 187 501 58 0 3 4 1009
Figure 3: Number of arrested suspects in 2008 per member state and per affiliation9
9 The UK provided Europol with information on a total of 256 arrests in 2008, without specifying the affiliation
of those arrested. Unlike previous editions of the TE-SAT, this number also includes arrests carried out in Northern
Ireland.
for attracting sympathisers and recruiting new
members.
Several terrorist and extremist organisations run
their own websites in different languages. In
2008 the number of Islamist extremist websites
in western languages increased, in particular
websites and weblogs on which translations of
statements by Islamist terrorist organisations
are published. Other terrorist groups prefer to
spread their statements, videos and publica-
tions via password-protected or open Internet
forums. There are indications that some terrorist
organisations, in particular Islamist terrorist
groups, have started expanding their propagan-
da efforts to specific audiences, defined by lan-
guage or ethnic affiliation, in addition to trying
to reach the wider general public.
Websites and Internet forums are often used to
claim attacks. Reports and commentaries, in
written form or as audio or video speeches, are
posted on websites in a bid to counter the pre-
vailing opinions of the media coverage on
events related to terrorism.
Left-wing, anarchist, right-wing and single issue
extremist organisations use their websites not
only to spread their ideology and make propa-
ganda but also to announce their activities
(demonstrations, concerts, etc.).This information
is generally available via a secure access for
members only.
Several websites are hosted on servers located
outside the EU. Their owners and webmasters
cannot be identified easily.
Role of women
The number of women arrested for terrorism-
related offences remains low within the EU. The
tasks assigned to women in terrorist organisa-
tions appear to differ from those of men.Women
are more involved in propaganda, facilitation,
support and financial activities, whereas men
are more involved in attack-related activities.
The percentage of women among the arrested
depends to a noticeable extent on the type of
terrorism. Between 2006 and 2008, female sus-
pects have constituted, in average, 7 percent of
Islamist terrorists arrested; 15 percent in case of
separatist terrorists; and 23 percent for left-wing
terrorists.
Nevertheless, women play an important role as
associates in supporting terrorist organisations
(translating texts on websites, providing their
names for subscriber registration, acting as
couriers, spreading propaganda, arranging mar-
riages of convenience, etc.). Their contribution
should not be underestimated.
Outside the EU, with regard to Islamist terrorism,
the number of female suicide bombers increa-
sed again during 2008. Female suicide bombers
are continuing to carry out attacks in Iraq and
increasingly in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
4.4. Convictions and 
penalties
In the course of 2008, 359 individuals were
tried on terrorism charges in the member
states in a total of 187 proceedings. Most, if not
all, convictions were related to terrorist
offences that occurred before 2008. Of the 359
individuals, 39 were women. The majority of
these women were tried for offences related to
separatist terrorism.
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Member State 2006 2007 2008
Belgium 24 5 12
Denmark 0 11 16
France 21 54 75
Germany 16 7 10
Greece 0 17 0
Ireland (Republic of) 0 6 9
Italy 0 47 25
Spain 154 231 141
Sweden 3 0 1
the Netherlands 20 8 12
UK 3 33 59
Total 241 419 360
Figure 4: Number of individuals tried in 2008 
for terrorism charges per member state10
10 One individual was tried both in Spain and Italy and has thus been counted twice in Figure 4, thereby bringing
the total for 2008 to 360.
In 2008 the number of individuals tried for ter-
rorism charges increased, as compared to 2007,
in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the
Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands and in the
UK. Spain saw a large decrease in individuals
being prosecuted and tried.
The data concerning 2006 were incomplete as a
result of underreporting of some member
states.11 Therefore, a comparison can only be
made between 2007 and 2008.
As in 2007, trials involving large groups of
defendants took place. This was the case in
France, where in one case of separatist terrorism
18 individuals were tried. In Belgium, five mem-
bers of a group related to the first European
female suicide bomber were tried. The five men
were found guilty of being part of a Brussels-
based terrorist cell that provided assistance to
the Belgian woman who on 9 November 2005
drove a vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device (VBIED) into an American convoy in Iraq.
Their assistance had consisted in organising
logistics for her travel to Iraq and bringing her
and her husband into contact with an Islamist
terrorist group connected to al-Qaeda in
Mesopotamia. The court sentenced the five
individuals to up to ten years’ imprisonment. On
27 June 2008, the court of appeal reduced the
sentences of three of them and acquitted the
other two. In a related trial at the Paris magis-
trate’s court on 11 December 2008, four men
were found guilty of having been involved in an
Islamist terrorist recruitment ring linked to this
Belgian cell. They were sentenced to prison
terms of three to six years.
The court proceedings resulted in 384 verdicts,
of which 50 percent were related to Islamist ter-
rorism and 39 percent were related to separatist
terrorism. The number of verdicts does not cor-
relate directly to the number of suspects tried
on terrorism charges as some suspects were
tried for more than one offence in separate
court proceedings (e.g. in Denmark, the
Netherlands, Spain and the UK).
In the UK, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands,
the vast majority of verdicts were linked to
Islamist terrorism. For France and Spain, the
majority of the verdicts were linked to separatist
terrorism. The verdict in Sweden was in relation
to a sentence imposed in 1989 for a series of
bombings in Copenhagen and Amsterdam in
1985, transforming a life sentence into 30 years’
imprisonment.
Of the 384 verdicts, 272 were convictions; 112 or
29 percent were acquittals. Of the 39 women
tried for terrorism charges, 13 or 33 percent
were acquitted.
Court proceedings in relation to Islamist terror-
ism had, as in 2007, the highest acquittal rate (34
percent).
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11 TE-SAT 2008, page 13.
Member State Islamist Separatist
Left 
Wing
Right 
Wing
Not 
Specified
Total 
Belgium 5 7 0 0 0 12
Denmark 10 0 0 0 7 17
France 31 44 0 0 0 75
Germany 8 2 0 0 0 10
Ireland (Republic of) 0 9 0 0 0 9
Italy 20 3 2 0 0 25
Spain 49 85 25 0 3 162
Sweden 1 0 0 0 0 1
the Netherlands 13 0 0 0 0 13
UK 53 5 0 2 0 60
Total 190 155 27 2 10 384
Figure 5: Number of verdicts for terrorism charges in 2008 per member state and per affiliation
12 Some individuals received more than one verdict in different court proceedings. In the Netherlands, one indi-
vidual was acquitted in one and convicted in another trial on different charges in 2008. In Denmark, a verdict
was issued against an organisation. For these reasons, the total number of verdicts differs from the number of
individuals in the previous figures. In Italy, the Supreme Court confirmed the conviction of one individual for his
connection to international Islamist terrorism to eight years’ imprisonment, while in Spain the Supreme Court
confirmed, in July 2008, the acquittal of the same individual for charges of involvement in the Madrid bombing.
13 For the purpose of this overview, sentences exceeding 40 years have been counted as 40 years. In one conclud-
ed trial in the UK, the pronouncement of the sentence for three convicted individuals has been postponed to
2009 and could thus not be included in the calculation.
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In Belgium, a trial linked to the DHKP-C is cur-
rently under appeal, after the court of cassation
referred the case back to trial.
National security authorities try to prevent and
disrupt acts of terrorism from occurring. This
explains the relatively high number of arrests
and the smaller number of persons tried for ter-
rorism charges. Judicial authorities, though, have
to find evidentiary support to the charges of
planning, intent or promotion of terrorism, which
is less tangible than evidence of a successfully
perpetrated terrorist attack and explains the
substantial numbers of acquittals. Often, sus-
pects arrested for terrorism-related offences are
later tried for offences other than terrorism.
In the Republic of Ireland and the UK, life sen-
tences were imposed. In the UK, there was an
indication of a minimum term to be served,
amounting to 32 years in one case and ten years
in another.
The average length of sentences in Spain
dropped to less than twelve years in 2008, com-
pared to fourteen years in 2007.
The highest sentence in France was 30 years,
imposed on a separatist terrorist who attempt-
ed to kill a French gendarme in Lucq de Bearn
(France) on 28 November 2001.
Please note that aside from imprisonment,
France often imposes a penalty of banishment
from its national territory. Also, in some cases a
financial penalty was imposed.
Member State Convicted Acquitted Total Verdicts Acquitted %
Belgium 7 5 12 42
Denmark 11 6 17 35
France 74 1 75 1
Germany 10 0 10 0
Ireland (Republic of) 7 2 9 22
Italy 23 2 25 8
Spain 87 75 162 47
Sweden 1 0 1 0
the Netherlands 7 6 13 46
UK 45 15 60 25
Total 272 112 384 23
Member State 2008 Average Years 
Belgium 3
Denmark 5
France 7
Germany 9
Ireland (Republic of) 11
Italy 6
Spain 12
Sweden 30
the Netherlands 6
UK 10
Figure 6: Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals in 2008 per member state12
Figure 7: Average penalty per individual convicted 
in 200813
5. ISLAMIST TERRORISM
In 2008 the EU was confronted with one attack
related to Islamist terrorism. A UK national deto-
nated a bomb in a restaurant in the South-West
of England.
There were no further Islamist terrorist attacks
within the EU during 2008. However, there are
clear indications that a range of activities relat-
ed to Islamist terrorism took place during 2008.
This was demonstrated by several arrests relat-
ed to attack planning activities by law enforce-
ment authorities in Spain, Belgium, France and
other countries.
Although the majority of EU member states
have not been targeted by Islamist terrorists,
some report that the perceived threat remains
high or even estimate that the risk of an attack
has increased for reasons that include military
presence in Afghanistan or Iraq,14 as illustrated
for example in Germany by threat videos explic-
itly naming the country.15 France also considers
itself a potential target of Islamist terrorist
17
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14 Member states with a military presence in Iraq during the whole year or part of 2008 were Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the UK. Apart from Cyprus and Malta, all EU member
states participated, with more or less troops, in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan
in 2008.
15 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Germany.
Key findings
■ In 2008 one bomb attack with Islamist 
terrorist background took place in the UK.
■ Arrests made in Spain, Belgium, France 
and other countries were related to attack 
planning activities. These plans indicate
that Islamist terrorists aim at causing 
indiscriminate mass casualties.
■ A number of member states judge that
they continue to face a high-level threat
from Islamist terrorism for reasons that
include military presence in Iraq or
Afghanistan or accusations of anti-Muslim
attitudes.
■ In 2008, 187 people were arrested on 
suspicion of Islamist terrorism. The majority
of arrests took place in France and Spain.
Arrested suspects had a variety of 
backgrounds, including North African,
South Asian, Turkish and also European.
■ ‘Home-grown’ terrorism is a cause of 
concern. A majority of the arrested 
individuals belonged to small autonomous
cells rather than to known terrorist 
organisations.
■ Islamist recruitment activities have largely
been driven underground. Radicalisation
activities are noted to have moved from
mosques and other public places into
private spaces. Prisons and the Internet
continue to be locations of concern 
regarding this phenomenon.
■ Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to have
replaced Iraq as preferred destinations 
for volunteers wishing to engage in armed
conflict.
attacks in the light of statements by terrorist
groups referring to the country’s military pres-
ence in Afghanistan, but also its history as a
colonial power; its support of the present
Algerian government; and its alleged hostility
towards Muslims following the law banning the
wearing of Muslim headscarf in schools.16
The Netherlands believe that a conceivable
threat from Islamist terrorism continues to exist
following the release of the film ‘Fitna’.17 The film,
produced and disseminated by a Dutch politi-
cian, has been interpreted, in the context of the
single narrative, as proof that the Netherlands
are an active player in an unjustified global war
on Islam. Denmark has found itself in a compara-
ble situation ever since the publication of car-
toons in a Danish newspaper depicting the
prophet Muhammad in early 2006.
5.1. Terrorist attacks
Bomb attack in the UK
In May 2008, a bomb exploded in a restaurant
located in a shopping mall in Exeter, South-West
England. The device, which consisted of caustic
soda, drain cleaner, kerosene and nails, went off
prematurely. In the event, only the attacker him-
self was injured.18
The suspect was an apparently vulnerable 22-
year-old UK national who had converted to
Islam. Acting alone, he was apparently ‘self-radi-
calised’ and ‘encouraged’ by literature and other
material on the Internet.
In October 2008, the suspect pleaded guilty to
attempted murder and preparing an act of ter-
rorism. In January 2009, he was jailed for life with
a recommendation that he should serve a mini-
mum of 18 years.
5.2. Arrested suspects
Of the 1009 persons that, according to informa-
tion from the member states, were arrested in
the EU in 2008 on suspicion of involvement in
terrorism, 187 were arrested in relation to
Islamist terrorism. This is a decrease of 7 percent
as compared to 2007, following an earlier
decrease of 21 percent from 2006 (257) to 2007
(201).19 The majority of the arrests took place
again in France and Spain, with 78 and 61
arrests, respectively.
The number of member states which reported
arrests related to Islamist terrorism decreased
from 14 in 2007 to ten in 2008. These were
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the
Republic of Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Slovakia, Spain and Sweden.
As in 2006 and 2007, the majority of the arrested
suspects came from North African countries,
most notably Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia,
although the share of Moroccan and Tunisian
citizens in the numbers of arrests halved as com-
pared to 2007. Like for 2007, France reported a
high number of arrests of French nationals in
2008. Other suspects apprehended in France in
2008 originated from various EU member states
(55 percent), including Belgium, Germany, Spain
and the Netherlands, and outside the EU (37
percent), such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Turkey.
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Figure 8: Number of failed, foiled or successful
attacks and number of arrested suspects
for Islamist terrorism in member states 
in 2008
16 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: France.
17 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: the Netherlands.
18 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: UK.
19 TE-SAT 2008, page 18.
Suspected membership of a terrorist organisa-
tion was by far the most common reason for
arrest in relation to Islamist terrorism. In a num-
ber of cases, it could be established or inferred
that the suspects were members of terrorist
organisations including al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU).
However, two thirds of the individuals arrested
on suspicion of involvement in Islamist terror-
ism could not be linked to terrorist organisa-
tions known to the authorities. This could be
seen as an indication of the existence of individ-
uals or groups unaffiliated to a terrorist organi-
sation but adhering to a common ideology of
global jihad, as promoted by al-Qaeda. It also
underlines the fact that al-Qaeda is evolving
into a sort of franchise organisation, which acts
as a point of reference for independent terrorist
groups or individuals.20
Individuals were also arrested for financing of
terrorism; the preparation of a terrorist attack or
related activities; terrorist training; recruitment
and propaganda.
Between 2005 and 2008, a number of individuals
arrested in France were members of networks
dispatching volunteers to Iraq. Recent develop-
ments, however, indicate that Afghanistan is
replacing Iraq as a destination for those who
want to participate in armed conflict.21
In Spain, police arrested 14 individuals of
Pakistani and Indian citizenship in January 2008
for allegedly planning to carry out suicide bomb
attacks in Barcelona and other European cities.22
Nearly half of the individuals arrested in 2008 for
links with Islamist terrorism were between 31
and 40 years of age at the time of their arrest.
People of this age group were engaged fre-
quently in training activities and relatively often
in financing of terrorism. Most of those arrested
in relation to recruitment and propaganda were
of younger age.
5.3. Terrorist activities
Radicalisation and recruitment
Among the large population of second gener-
ation Muslim immigrants in the European
Union, some individuals and groups of individ-
uals have proven vulnerable to recruitment
and radicalisation. For some time, there have
been indications of connections between UK-
based supporters of violent jihad and their
counterparts in Pakistan.23
Information from member states and open
sources indicates that the role of mosques in
the radicalisation and recruitment of Islamist
terrorists is declining. This is due, to a large
part, to the fact that Muslim communities have
become more vigilant and willing to confront
extremism.24 Although some mosques contin-
ue to be used for radicalisation,25 Islamist ter-
rorist recruitment efforts have largely been
driven underground, with little overt propaga-
tion and recruitment now occurring at mos-
ques. The main players in Islamist terrorist
recruitment are no longer ‘radical imams’, but
‘activists’, i.e. members of terrorist cells acting
outside the organisational framework of
mosques. Prisons and other places in which
individuals are likely to be vulnerable, lack ori-
entation or experience personal crises (‘places
of vulnerability’) continue to be a cause of con-
cern.26 Sources in member states point out the
risk of radicalisation in prisons.27
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20 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Italy.
21 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: France.
22 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Spain.
23 TE-SAT 2008, page 21.
24 P.R. Neumann and B. Rogers,‘Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe’, a study
carried out by King’s College, London, for the European Commission (Directorate General Justice, Freedom and
Security), London, December 2007.
25 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Spain.
26 Neumann and Rogers, ‘Recruitment and Mobilisation’.
27 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Spain.
There are marked regional differences within
the EU with regard to radicalisation and recruit-
ment linked to Islamist terrorism. To a number of
member states, the topic of radicalisation is of
very small concern or is not an issue on their ter-
ritories at all.28
The Internet plays a pivotal role in recruitment
and indoctrination. It offers the possibility to
disseminate tailor-made propaganda to restrict-
ed target audiences. (See also above, page 13.)
Nevertheless, the Internet cannot fully replace
the personal interaction between potential
recruits and recruiters.
Propaganda
Terrorists can promote their agenda through
the media and, in particular, the Internet with
great ease. Events in areas such as the Middle
East, Pakistan and Afghanistan are exploited by
propagandists of the ideology of global jihad to
promote the single narrative of an alleged glob-
al war on Islam. These and other factors con-
tribute to the fact that an increasing number of
people are attracted to the global message
articulated by actors such as the al-Qaeda lead-
ership and subsequently recruited by terrorist
groups. Besides this, the greater number of peo-
ple known to adhere to extremist ideas is also a
result of the continuing efforts made by the
authorities involved to better understand the
nature of the threat in order to take effective
counter-action, thereby exposing the scale of
the problem.29
One of the reasons for the attraction of the ide-
ology of global jihad may be that it gives mean-
ing to the feeling of exclusion, prevalent in par-
ticular among second or third generation immi-
grants who no longer identify with the country
and the culture of their parents or grandpar-
ents, yet feel also excluded from western socie-
ty, which still perceives them as foreigners. For
this group, the idea of becoming ‘citizens’ of the
virtual worldwide Islamic community, removed
from territory and national culture, may be
more attractive than for first generation immi-
grants.30
In its single narrative, al-Qaeda’s ideology links
the perceived exclusion of Muslims from society
in Europe to regional conflicts worldwide, such
as in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq,
Algeria, and Somalia. Ideologues of the al-Qaeda
leadership and affiliated terrorist groups, such
as AQIM, are quick to respond to any political
and military crisis in these regions, with special
attention to the developments in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.
The UK reports that loose-knit terrorist networks
linked to al-Qaeda take their lead from the radi-
cal propaganda readily available on the Internet.
The extent to which such material may cause a
person to contemplate carrying out acts of vio-
lence is rarely clear cut but has undoubtedly
been a factor in some of the investigations in
the UK during 2008. Perhaps most notable was
the bomb attack in a restaurant in Exeter in May
(See above, page 18).31
In Austria, two individuals stood trial in Vienna
in March 2008 on charges of spreading propa-
ganda messages on the Internet under the
name of the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF).32
They were convicted, in the trial of first instance,
of translating into German and disseminating
propaganda of Islamist terrorist organisations,
and publishing a video message in an attempt
to coerce the governments of Austria and
Germany to withdraw from Afghanistan. The
two defendants were sentenced to imprison-
ment of four years and 22 months, respectively.
At the time of writing, their appeals were still
pending.33
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28 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Republic of Ireland, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden.
29 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: UK.
30 Neumann and Rogers, ‘Recruitment and Mobilisation’, page 28.
31 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: UK.
32 See also TE-SAT 2008, page 22.
33 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Austria. In the absence of final decisions, this case was not included in the
overall number of convictions (see paragraph 4.4).
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Training
In 2008, 15 persons were arrested in the EU for
paramilitary training activities linked to Islamist
terrorism. All of these arrests took place in
France in the region of Carcassonne.Three of the
arrested persons were women.
The Internet is also an important tool for train-
ing. Nevertheless, like in recruitment, it cannot
replace real-life training and personal interac-
tion with experienced fighters and activists
abroad. The Internet is best viewed as a resource
bank for self-radicalised and ‘home-grown’ auto-
nomous cells, or in situations where real life
training is considered to be problematic, rather
than as a substitute for classical training in mili-
tary training camps.34 As a result, recruits still
travel to training camps as part of their radicali-
sation process.35
Logistical support
Although some member states consider the
threat from Islamist terrorism as moderate to
low, many report on activities related to logisti-
cal support of Islamist terrorist groups on their
territory.36 Terrorist cells in Spain, e.g., facilitated
the entry into the country of Islamist terrorists,
either by providing them with false documents
(passports, residence permits, proof of resi-
dence, employment contracts) or by providing
money and safe accommodation.
In Austria, several investigations were conducted
on suspicion of financing of Islamist terrorism in
2008. Most of the cases were initiated in
response to notifications from financial institutes.
The investigations focused on both natural and
legal persons. Suspects included individuals of
North African origin who allegedly raised funds
for terrorist organisations via property-related
crime. There were indications that these people
were active participants in a European network.37
In Sweden, most resident Islamist individuals
and networks that promote violence are found
not to primarily intend to carry out attacks
against the country and its interests, but rather
to use Sweden as a base for providing logistical
support for activities in other countries. The
same applies to individuals and groups in
Slovenia. Slovenia reports also that it could be
used as a transit area to allow terrorists to reach
target countries. In the UK, there are — in addi-
tion to individuals who may seek to carry out
attacks, whether in the UK or abroad — others
who remain prepared to provide support to ter-
rorists through the provision of funds, logistical
support and training. The kinds of training
offered range from the practical skills required
to carry out terrorist acts to the promotion of
extremist material.38
5.4. Situation outside the EU
In 2008 several EU nationals were killed in ter-
rorist attacks or became victims of acts of
Islamist terrorists outside the EU. Developments
and events in relation to terrorism in certain
regions or countries which have impacted mem-
ber states or could become of relevance to the
EU are briefly described.
North Africa and Sahel
After its alignment with the al-Qaeda leader-
ship, AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), perpetrated
large-scale coordinated suicide attacks on
Algerian and international targets in the
Algerian capital Algiers on 11 April and 11
December 2007. In 2008 the number of suicide
attacks in Algeria was even higher than in 2007.
The capital Algiers was spared major terrorist
attacks.39 Some of the suicide attacks caused lar-
ge numbers of casualties, such as on 19 August
2008, when a suicide attacker killed 43 people
34 Anne Stenersen, ‘The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20, Issue 2 (April
2008), pages 215 to 233.
35 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Belgium, Germany.
36 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Republic of Ireland, Latvia, Slovenia,
Sweden, Spain.
37 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Austria.
38 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Slovenia, Sweden, UK.
39 However, the Algerian security forces stated that they thwarted a plot to perpetrate suicide attacks in Algiers
on the first anniversary of the 11 April 2007 attacks.‘Algeria forces kill 10 rebel bomb plotters-source’, Reuters,
16 April 2008.
and injured 38 in front of a paramilitary police
training school.40 The vast majority of incidents
linked to AQIM in 2008 took place in the Kabylie
region east of Algiers, one of its traditional
strongholds, where the group’s central com-
mand is said to be located.41
As in past years,42 AQIM continued to consider
the Algerian government and all western
nations as potential targets and threatened to
perpetrate more attacks on western interests. It
claimed to have expanded its activities to neigh-
bouring states in the Maghreb and the Sahel
and to have recruited members from as far
south as Nigeria.43 In online statements and
videos, AQIM’s leader commented on the situa-
tion in Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
Special interest was placed on Mauritania: AQIM
claimed responsibility for a gunfire attack on the
Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott on 1 February
2008 and an attack on a Mauritanian army con-
voy on 14 September 2008. In an online state-
ment, AQIM accused the USA, France and Israel
of connivance in the coup d’état in Mauritania
and called for a jihad against the new military
government.
Two Austrian tourists were kidnapped in south-
ern Tunisia on 22 February 2008.They were final-
ly released in Mali on 31 October 2008. The kid-
napping was claimed in online statements
signed in the name of AQIM. The statements
demanded, among other things, the withdrawal
of Austrian soldiers from Afghanistan and the
release of two alleged members of the GIMF
sentenced in Austria for publishing threat
videos against Germany and Austria.
Iraq
There are indications that the influence of al-
Qaeda in Mesopotamia, now forming part of the
Islamic State of Iraq, has diminished in Iraq and
that some of the foreign fighters have now left
the country. Individuals affiliated with al-Qaeda
have begun to leave for other conflict zones,
including Afghanistan and Pakistan.44
Reliable figures on the total number of foreign
fighters who have travelled to Iraq since the US-
led invasion are unavailable. Some reports esti-
mate that they constituted around 10 percent of
the forces of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia in Iraq
and that these 10 percent were responsible for
90 percent of the suicide bomb attacks in the
country.45
Yemen
It is difficult to assess the situation and the
degree of organisation of the Yemeni branch of
al-Qaeda, the establishment of which had been
publicised in 2007 on various Islamist websites.
However, one of its branches, the Kata’ib Jund al-
Yemen or Yemen Soldiers Brigades, has commit-
ted a number of terrorist attacks, including sui-
cide bombings, targeting foreigners and foreign
interests in Yemen in 2008.
Among the attacks against EU interests claimed
by this group in 2008 was an attack which led to
the killing of two Belgian tourists on 18 January
2008, and one against the Italian embassy in
Sana’a on 30 April 2008.
Somalia
A number of Islamist militant groups in Somalia
continued to fight the Somali transitional gov-
ernment and Ethiopian troops in Somalia,
before the latter withdrew from the country in
January 2009.
Terrorist attacks, carried out by means of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and sui-
cide attacks, have been committed in the coun-
try. Some attacks targeted African Union
peacekeepers. A roadside bomb killed three aid
TE-SAT
2009
22
40 ‘Bombing kills dozens in Algeria’, BBC News, 19 August 2008.
41 Hanna Rogan,‘Violent Trends in Algeria Since 9/11’, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 12 (November 2008), pages 16 to 19.
42 TE-SAT 2008, page 24.
43 ‘An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal’, New York Times, 1 July 2008.
44 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: France.
45 ‘Foreign fighters leaving Iraq, military says’, USA Today, 31 March 2008.
workers including a French member of
Médecins sans frontières in January 2008.46
Several aid workers and journalists have also
been kidnapped in Somalia.
The fighting in Somalia has seen the emergence
of a group called Harakat al-Shabab al-
Mujahidin or Mujahideen Youth Movement, which
promotes martyrdom operations and, further-
more, publicises its activities in a manner com-
parable to al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
In 2007 credible evidence indicated that non-
Somali fighters were active in the country
alongside the Somali Islamist groups and also
providing training in tactics and propaganda.47
Afghanistan
In 2008 the Taliban were responsible for a num-
ber of attacks in Afghanistan, including attacks
on high-profile targets such as the Serena hotel
on 14 January and a suicide attack on the Indian
embassy in Kabul, as well as an attempt on the
life of President Karzai at a ceremony taking
place outside Kabul.
No reliable statistics regarding the number of
suicide attacks in Afghanistan are available for
2008. However, the number of suicide attacks
committed in 2006 an 2007 appears to range
between 135 and 145. This modus operandi is
still employed by terrorists in Afghanistan and
leads to large numbers of civilian casualties.
A number of these attacks appear to have been
committed by foreign fighters including at least
one by a German citizen.
Furthermore, during 2008, the Taliban were
responsible for the deliberate killing of a num-
ber of aid workers, including a British Christian
woman, who was accused by the Taliban of pros-
elytising, and three female International Rescue
Committee (IRC) employees, who were labelled
as spies.
The killing of at least 19 aid workers in 2008
appears to be a deliberate policy of the Taliban
to deter foreign aid and deteriorate the situation
of the Afghan people in a bid to further under-
mine the position of the Afghan government.
Pakistan
Together with Afghanistan, Pakistan remains the
central front in the fight against the al-Qaeda
leadership and movements affiliated to its ideol-
ogy such as the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba or the
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). There is strong suspi-
cion that at least part of the al-Qaeda leadership
is located in the Pakistan tribal areas and
attracts new contingents of foreign volunteers,
including some from the EU member states, to
the region.
Reports indicate that the Pakistani Terhik-e-
Taliban movement is in full control of the tribal
areas and has gained ground in the North-West
Frontier Province. A Polish engineer was kid-
napped in a tribal area in September 2008.48
Most of the suicide attacks reported in Pakistan
in 2008 took place in the North-West Frontier
Province.
The suicide attack against the Marriott hotel in
Islamabad on 20 September 2008 could be seen
as a major blow for the Pakistani authorities.This
hotel had previously been targeted by a suicide
attack and no specific additional security meas-
ures appear to have been put into place by the
time of the second attack, which killed 60 peo-
ple including five foreigners, among them the
Czech ambassador to Pakistan.
Other attacks directly targeted western citizens:
on 15 March a bomb detonated at a popular
restaurant in Islamabad and, on 2 June, the
Danish embassy became the target of a VBIED.
The latter was claimed by the ‘central command’
of al-Qaeda.
India
Between May and October 2008, India experi-
enced a number of terrorist attacks, such as the
series of bombs detonated in Jaipur, Bangalore,
Ahmadabad, Delhi, Gujarat, Agarta Imphal and
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46 ‘Aid staff withdrawn from Somalia’, BBC News, 1 February 2008.
47 See also TE-SAT 2008, pages 25 to 26.
48 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Poland.
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Assam. Not all of these attacks were committed
by Islamist terrorist groups.
A series of coordinated attacks in Mumbai from
26 to 29 November killed 174 people.49 The tar-
gets included two iconic hotels of the Indian
financial capital, namely the Taj Mahal and the
Oberoi Trident. The attacks, which were attrib-
uted to the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-
Taiba, aimed at causing a maximum of casualties
in the ‘soft targets’ chosen. Part of the plan was
apparently to attract large media coverage as a
result of a great number of victims, including cit-
izens of western states.
The attack against these two hotels follows on
from the assault on the Serena hotel in Kabul on
14 January 2008 and from the two suicide
attacks against the Marriott hotel in Islamabad
on 26 January 2007 and 20 September 2008. The
apparently thorough planning of the Mumbai
attacks indicates that the attackers could rely on
experiences of previous attacks and adapted
their operation accordingly.50
49 ‘Death toll in Mumbai attacks revised down to 174’, The Guardian (UK), 30 November 2008.
50 Europol research shows that, outside the EU, four, ten and eleven terrorist attacks against hotels were carried out
in 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively, with total numbers of fatalities of five, 36 and 109.These figures exclude the
Mumbai attacks in November 2008. Both in 2006 and 2008, one attack per year against hotels was carried out in
the EU without causing fatalities. No terrorist attacks against hotels were carried out in the EU in 2007.
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6. ETHNO-NATIONALIST 
AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM
6.1. Terrorist attacks
In 2008, 397 terrorist attacks were claimed or
attributed to separatist terrorist organisations.
Of these attacks, 98 percent took place in France
and Spain.
The number of separatist terrorist attacks in
2008 is comparable to that of 2006, but
decreased by 25 percent in comparison to 2007.
This is mainly due to the fact that, in 2008,
France experienced 46 percent less attacks than
in 2007. Also in Spain the number of separatist
terrorist attacks decreased by 4 percent in com-
parison to 2007. Of the total number of attacks,
91 percent were carried out successfully.
Figure 9: Number of failed, foiled or successful 
attacks and number of arrested suspects
for separatist terrorism in member states 
in 2008
Key findings
■ Separatist terrorism remains the area of
terrorism which affects the EU most. Four
persons died in attacks committed by ETA
in 2008.
■ A total of 397 separatist terrorist attacks
were perpetrated; 501 suspects were
arrested. The number of attacks decreased
in 2008 by 25 percent in comparison to
2007, thereby reaching the level of 2006.
■ The majority of arrests related to separatist
terrorism occurred in France and Spain.
Significant arrests in these countries led to
the dismantling of several ETA cells when
some top leaders were arrested.
■ Youth organisations linked to ETA continue
to be responsible for the vast majority of
the Basque separatist terrorist attacks in
Spain.
■ Target selection remains dependent on 
the political goals of the groups concerned.
As in previous years, Corsican separatist
terrorist groups mainly targeted private
property or individuals, while Basque 
separatist terrorist groups mainly carried
out attacks against business and govern-
mental targets.
■ The activities of separatist movements 
outside the EU have an impact on the 
security situation inside the EU.
As in previous years, the number of casualties
and fatalities caused by separatist terrorist
attacks remained limited. However, Spanish law
enforcement officials and some groups of busi-
nesspeople remained an explicit target of
Basque separatist terrorism. In 2008 four per-
sons died in four separate attacks carried out by
Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque for ‘Basque
Homeland and Freedom’): a Guardia Civil agent,
a warrant officer of the army, a politician and a
businessman.
The businessman assassinated by ETA was the
owner of a company working on a high-speed
train route between the autonomous region of
the Basque Country and Madrid. ETA has threat-
ened many companies and their workers
involved in this train project, which it considers
has been imposed on the Basque Country by
the Spanish and French governments.51 ETA’s
goals are centred on the sovereignty and self-
determination of Euskal Herria, which comprises
the Spanish autonomous regions of the Basque
Country and Navarre as well as the French
Basque Country.
ETA had declared a ceasefire which lasted from
March 2006 to June 2007. After the ending of
the ceasefire, ETA has resumed its attacks. In
2008 ETA carried out 35 attacks, spread almost
evenly over the period of February to December
2008. The majority of the attacks by ETA cells
took place either in the autonomous region of
the Basque Country or in neighbouring Spanish
provinces.
The modus operandi used by ETA to commit
attacks involved the use of explosives: IEDs,
followed by VBIEDs. The decreasing trend in the
use of commercial explosives in ETA attacks that
started in 2007 continued in 2008: more IEDs
containing home-made explosives were used.
This may indicate that ETA is encountering
increasing difficulties in the acquisition of com-
mercial explosives.52
The majority of terrorist acts perpetrated by
Basque separatist terrorists in Spain are so-
called Taldes Y attacks, which are committed by
a network of individuals with links to ETA’s
youth organisation SEGI.53 In 2008, 211 Taldes Y
attacks were committed. ETA encourages its
supporters to engage in street fights against
anyone voicing criticism of ETA. These fights
took the form of attacks against buildings of
government agencies, law enforcement and
political parties, bank offices, public transport
systems, or businesses related to the high-
speed train under construction.
Of the Taldes Y attacks in 2008, 43 percent were
committed in the first two months of the year.
The high frequency of attacks in this period of
time seems to be a response to the banning of
the political party Acción Nacionalista Vasca
(ANV), the successor organisation of the previ-
ously declared illegal Batasuna.
The modus operandi of Taldes Y attacks remained
unchanged in 2008. Mainly incendiary devices
or flammable liquids were used.
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Figure 10: Number of failed, foiled or successful
attacks and number of arrested suspects
for separatist terrorism in member states
2006-2008
51 ‘ETA asesina a tiros en Azpeitia a un empresario vinculado con la “Y vasca”’, El Mundo, 3 December 2008.
52 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Spain.
53 TE-SAT 2008, page 28.
The terrorist group Resistência Galega, which
operates in the Spanish autonomous region of
Galicia, carried out seven attacks. These had lim-
ited effects and caused only small-scale proper-
ty damage.54
In France, 123 attacks were carried out by
Corsican separatist groups, one third of which
were claimed under the umbrella of the Front de
Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC). Basque
separatist groups carried out 14 attacks.
As in the previous years, Basque and Corsican
separatist groups carried out attacks against dif-
ferent types of targets. Although there is a
decrease in the attacks against private property
and individuals in France,55 these continue to be
the main targets of Corsican separatist terrorist
groups. Basque separatist terrorist groups in
Spain and France focused mainly on attacks
against business and governmental targets in
2008.56
Corsican separatist terrorist groups mainly
attack property of people considered non-
Corsicans. A high number of targets of Corsican
separatist terrorist groups are holiday apart-
ments and houses. In addition, cars of non-
Corsican residents and real estate agencies
renting holiday houses were attacked.
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54 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Spain.
55 Private property includes holiday apartments and cars.
56 Governmental targets in Spain include government offices, court houses, and political parties. Business targets in
Spain include ATMs, bank branches, real estate agencies. Business targets in France include real estate agencies
and the tourist sector. Critical infrastructure in Spain includes highways and railways.
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Although the Irish National Liberation Army
(INLA) has declared a cease-fire in 1998, two sep-
aratist terrorist attacks targeting private proper-
ty took place in the Republic of Ireland and were
attributed to the INLA in 2008. The increase in
terrorist activities in the Republic of Ireland is
reflected in the number of persons arrested and
charged with unlawful membership of the
organisation and other related offences during
2008.57
In Austria, three failed and two successful arson
attacks were reported for 2008. All of the attacks
were attributed to PKK/KONGRA-GEL.58 At least
two of the attacks targeted directly Turkish
interests.
6.2. Arrested suspects
In 2008 a total of 501 persons were arrested in
eight member states for offences related to sep-
aratist terrorism. The majority of the individuals
were arrested in France and Spain. During the
last months of 2008, several ETA cells were dis-
mantled and some top leaders were arrested in
France and Spain. This will probably impact on
ETA’s capabilities in 2009.
In Spain, 40 percent of the arrested were
accused of attack-related offences, 22 percent
for facilitation.59 During 2008, several operations
against Taldes Y / SEGI resulted in the arrest of 67
suspects in the autonomous regions of the
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Figure 12: Type of targets in attacks by Corsican and Basque separatist terrorists in France and Basque separatist
terrorists in Spain 2006-2008
57 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Republic of Ireland.
58 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Austria.
59 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Spain.
Basque Country and Navarre. In addition, a num-
ber of other suspects were arrested in the
process of committing the attacks.60
In France, 64 percent of the suspects were
arrested for Corsican and 34 percent for Basque
separatist terrorist offences. Of the individuals
arrested for Corsican separatist terrorism, 62
percent were suspected of attack-related
offences. Almost half of the Basque separatist
terrorist suspects in France were arrested for
financing of terrorism.
In 2008 German authorities arrested a number
of presumed PKK/KONGRA-GEL members,
including several leaders, such as area chiefs.
Only one person was arrested for terrorism-
related offences. In October 2008, a 40-year-old
Turk of Kurdish background was arrested. The
individual arrested was accused of having led
what was then the PKK/KONGRA-GEL region
South in Germany during the period of January
1993 until at least 1994.61
In March 2008, Italian authorities arrested a cash
courier of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL.62 In Slovakia,
one individual was arrested on suspicion of sup-
porting the PKK/KONGRA-GEL.63
In the Republic of Ireland, 49 persons were arres-
ted for offences related to separatist terrorism.
The majority of them, 28, were members of the
INLA, while nine were members of the Real Irish
Republican Army (RIRA) and four were linked to
the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA).64
As in previous years, a number of suspected
members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) were arrested in the EU for offences
linked to financing of terrorism. In Italy, 34 LTTE
members were arrested. Of these, 33 were sus-
pected of extortion and transferring money to
Sri Lanka.65 In France, two individuals were
arrested for similar offences.66
6.3. Terrorist activities
ETA
Inside the EU, France remains ETA’s main fallback
base, from which the group continually impro-
ves its logistical means and where its reserve
activists are hosted and trained militarily.67
Overall, the influence of Spanish Basque sepa-
ratist terrorism outside the EU is marginal.
However, past contacts between ETA and the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas
(FARC) or Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia came to light during 2008.68 The FARC
may have entertained these contacts for strate-
gic reasons, aiming at benefitting from ETA’s
experience and expertise in urban terrorism to
increase their own capabilities in this field.
The UK extradited three ETA members to Spain.
Canadian authorities extradited one ETA mem-
ber to Spain and deported another.
Corsica
In France, the death of four activists of the clan-
destine scene in 2006 and 2007 and a number of
arrests led to the emergence of a group calling
itself ‘FLNC 1976’. It called upon the ‘combatants’
of the two main terrorist separatist groups, the
Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse – Union
des Combattants (FLNC-UDC) and the Front de
Libération Nationale de la Corse du 22 Octobre
(FLNC-22 Octobre), to unite on the basis of the
programme of the original FLNC.
Northern Ireland
Although the terrorist threat related to Northern
Ireland has diminished in recent years, with the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the
main loyalist groups ceasing their terrorist cam-
paigns and engaging in peaceful political
process, dissident Irish republican groups,
29
TE-SAT
2009
6.ETH
N
O
-N
A
TIO
N
A
LIST 
A
N
D
 SEPA
R
A
TIST TER
R
O
R
ISM
60 Crónica: Boletín de documentación y actualidad, no 1404 (Bilbao: Vasco Press, 12 January 2009).
61 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Germany.
62 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Italy.
63 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Slovakia.
64 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Republic of Ireland.
65 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Italy.
66 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: France.
67 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Spain, France.
68 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Colombia.
principally the RIRA and the CIRA, and other
paramilitary groups continue to engage in
crime and violence, including shootings and the
use of IEDs. Incidents have included the placing
of incendiary devices in commercial premises,
attempted attacks against infrastructure, such
as roads and railways, and attacks targeting the
police, including an IED attack against an off-
duty police officer, which resulted in serious
injury.69 It can be expected that these terrorist
activities may continue in the future.
PKK/KONGRA-GEL
In Turkey, the armed wing of the PKK/KONGRA-
GEL, named the People's Defence Forces, has
been fighting for an independent Kurdistan or,
at the very least, for cultural and political auton-
omy of the Kurdish people in south-eastern
Turkey. Developments in this region have a di-
rect impact on the level of security in Europe.70
With relatively large communities of Kurds in
some member states, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL is
able to organise propaganda activities, such as
demonstrations, marches, culture festivals and
various campaigns, in an attempt to attract new
supporters in Europe.
In mid-October 2008, the lawyers of the
PKK/KONGRA-GEL founder imprisoned in Turkey
declared that their client had been physically mis-
treated by the prison personnel. Subsequent to
publications by Kurdish media on the torture ac-
cusations, the political-propagandistic wing of the
PKK/KONGRA-GEL appealed to the Kurds in Eu-
rope to organise ‘democratic’ protest meetings.71
Against this background, demonstrations with
Kurdish participants were held in several mem-
ber states. During the demonstrations, pre-
sumed PKK/KONGRA-GEL members or sympa-
thisers committed sporadic criminal or terrorist
offences, such as incendiary attacks, arson, and
assault and property damage. These actions
mainly targeted Turkish organisations.72 Consi-
dering the timing of the demonstrations, it can
be assumed that these were centrally organised
by the PKK/KONGRA-GEL.
LTTE
The LTTE aims to create an independent state
for the Tamils, referred to as Tamil Eelam, in the
northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. The
fight between the Singhalese-dominated gov-
ernment and the resistance movement of the
Tamil minority in Sri Lanka has been raging
since 1983. A cease-fire was observed between
February 2002 and January 2008,73 when the Sri
Lankan government started to advance into the
areas controlled by the LTTE.74
The LTTE controls a global network of Tamils and
associations with structures dedicated to
fundraising, procurement and propaganda firm-
ly established in Europe. The LTTE has built effi-
cient mechanisms to exercise strong control
over Tamil communities in the EU and other
parts of the world.75 One of the core activities of
the LTTE in the EU is the collection of funds from
Tamil communities on a monthly basis to
finance military procurement.76 The LTTE has
been on the EU list of terrorist organisations
since 2006.77
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69 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: UK.
70 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Austria.
71 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Germany, Finland, Austria.
72 For the time being, the attacks committed by PKK/KONGRA-GEL in Germany are of minor significance.
Therefore, they are not counted as terrorist attacks, although they are considered as politically motivated.
Austria reported five attacks by PKK/KONGRA-GEL as terrorist offences. TE-SAT data is based on the member
states’ definitions of terrorism.
73 The Sri Lankan government called off the cease-fire on 16 January 2008. On 2 January 2009, the Sri Lankan army
entered the LTTE’s ‘capital’ Killinochchi.
74 ‘Sri Lanka navy claims last rebel ship sunk’, www.channelnewsasia.com, 7 October 2007.
75 Human Rights Watch, ‘Funding the “Final War”: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora’, Vol. 18,
No. 1(C), 14 March 2006.
76 ‘Feeding the Tiger: how Sri Lankan insurgents fund their war’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 August 2007.
77 EU Council Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 29 May 2006.
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out successfully but caused only property dam-
age. No injuries or fatalities were reported.
The majority of left-wing and anarchist terrorist
attacks in 2008 were carried out using an IED.
Arson attacks represented 32 percent of the
total number of attacks as compared to 55 per-
cent in 2007. In Greece and Italy most of the
attacks were bombings. The majority of the
arson attacks took place in Spain. The choice of
targets remains unchanged: business and gov-
ernment interests were the main targets in both
2007 and 2008.78
7. LEFT-WING AND 
ANARCHIST TERRORISM
7.1. Terrorist attacks
In 2008 Greece, Spain and Italy reported a total
of 28 attacks carried out by left-wing and anar-
chist groups. This constitutes an increase of 25
percent as compared to 2007. In 2006, however,
the number of attacks had reached a similar
level. The majority of these attacks were carried
78 Governmental targets include government offices, police offices, and buildings of international institu-
tions. Business targets include ATMs, bank branches, private and commercial companies (oil companies, car
dealers, etc.).
Figure 13: Number of failed, foiled or successful
attacks and number of arrested suspects
for left-wing and anarchist terrorism in
member states in 2008
Key findings
■ Three member states reported a total
number of 28 left-wing terrorist attacks
for 2008. These took place in Greece,
Spain and Italy.
■ The majority of left-wing and anarchist 
terrorist attacks targeted business and 
governmental targets.
■ Most attacks were carried out by IEDs.
Arson accounted for one third of the
reported incidents.
■ In 2008, 58 individuals were arrested for
left-wing terrorism. Nearly half were 
members of the DHKP-C, arrested in France,
Germany and Cyprus.
■ GRAPO is assessed to be no longer 
operational.
■ Left-wing and anarchist groups have 
established links across Europe. Most of
their actions reflect a common agenda.
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Greece reported a total of 13 left-wing and anar-
chist attacks in 2008.
The terrorist group Epanastatikos Agonas or
Revolutionary Struggle remained active in 2008
and claimed three attacks targeting a police sta-
tion in April, an international oil company in
October and a police bus carrying 19 officers in
December. The use of firearms during attacks
against police targets raises concern that violent
acts by the Epanastatikos Agonas could further
escalate.
The group Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias Athina-
Thessaloniki or Cells of Fire Conspiracy of
Thessalonica and Athens claimed seven attacks
in 2008. Main targets were police and the mili-
tary but also a vehicle of the Italian embassy in
Athens. One attack on 25 June 2008 in Greece
targeting a building housing the offices of sev-
eral international companies was originally
reported as ‘not specified’ and is categorised as
such in the general overview. However, the
attack is now attributed to the left-wing organi-
sation Laiki Thelisi or People’s Will. 79
In Spain all ten attacks in 2008 are attributed to
anarchist groups. The majority took place in
Barcelona and targeted business interests. Six
attacks were successfully carried out, albeit with
limited repercussions.
Italy reported five successful attacks in 2008.
Four attacks were directed against banks and
car dealerships; one targeted a police station.
7.2. Arrested suspects and
terrorist activities
A total of 58 persons were arrested in 2008 for
left-wing and anarchist terrorism in six member
states: France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Germany and
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Figure 14: Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks by target 2006-2008
79 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Greece.
Cyprus. With 48 arrests in 2007, this is an
increase of 21 percent.
The majority of the arrested were suspected of
membership of a terrorist organisation. Another
20 people were arrested, in France and Italy,
for attack-related offences. Furthermore, eight
arrests for financing of terrorism — all linked to
the Turkish left-wing party Devrimci Halk
Kurtulus¸ Partisi / Cephesi (DHKP-C) or Revolutio-
nary People’s Liberation Party/Front — were
reported by France and Germany. Spain repor-
ted five arrests for, among other charges, pro-
paganda.
As a result of an Italian investigation into the
activities of the terrorist organisation Partito
Comunista Politico-Militare (PCP-M), four mem-
bers of the Belgian branch of Secours Rouge
International (Secours Rouge/APAPC) were
arrested in Belgium. Amongst those four per-
sons was a former member of the Cellules
Communistes Combattantes (CCC), a left-wing
terrorist group active in Belgium in the mid-
1980s.80
In Spain, the decrease from 17 arrests for left-
wing and anarchist terrorism in 2007 to six in
2008 can be attributed to the dismantling, in
recent years, of the Spanish terrorist organisa-
tion Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero
de Octubre (GRAPO). In January 2008, five
GRAPO members were arrested on suspicion of
propaganda, financing, recruitment and train-
ing activities for the group. No activities by
GRAPO have come to notice in 2008. It is
assessed that currently only a few militants are
still at large.81
Italian authorities see a continued threat posed
by left-wing terrorist groups after the disman-
tling of the PCP-M in 2007. Although no attacks
were attributed to the Federazione Anarchica
Informale (FAI) in 2008, a number of investiga-
tions confirmed the vitality of the anarchist
insurrectionist movement in Italy.82
In 2008 suspected members of the DHKP-C were
arrested in France, Germany and Cyprus. In
October, the French wing of the organisation
was dismantled with the arrest of six persons
accused of financing terrorist activities in
Turkey. The DHKP-C continues to maintain
organisational structures in Germany, which it
uses mainly for purposes of logistics and propa-
ganda. During 2008, three presumed leaders of
the DHKP-C in Europe were arrested in Germany.
No violent acts which could be attributed to the
group have been noticed in Germany since
1999.83
One Turkish citizen linked to the DHKP-C was
found in possession of false documents and
arrested at Larnaca airport in Cyprus.
In November 2008, after a lengthy investiga-
tion, French authorities arrested ten persons
suspected of a series of attacks on the high-
speed rail network. They were suspected of
being involved in sabotaging the overhead
power cables and the ensuing disruption of rail
traffic in France.
7.3. Extremism
Belgium reported an increase in actions by anar-
chist groups, mainly in the cities of Brussels and
Ghent. Furthermore, it appears that actions by
these groups became more radical in 2008.
Anarchists are reported to have made increas-
ing use of Molotov cocktails. There are estab-
lished links with French, Greek and Italian anar-
chists, as demonstrated by a case in which a
Greek citizen, driving a car registered in France
with Belgian, Greek and Italian persons on
board, was caught when he painted graffiti on
the walls of the Brussels courthouse.84
Activities of particular groups within the anar-
chist movement are inspired by particular
themes, such as anti-militarism, support for
‘political prisoners’, immigration and environ-
mentalism, which are part of the traditional
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80 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Belgium.
81 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Spain.
82 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Italy.
83 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Germany.
84 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Belgium.
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campaign topics of the international anarchist
scene.85
The UK reported a noticeable increase in protest
and street activity by extreme right-wing
groups. This was accompanied by an increase in
counter-protests on these occasions by greater
numbers of violent ANTIFA or anti-fascist ele-
ments. (See also right-wing terrorism.)
In December 2008, a series of demonstrations
took place in Greece after a 15-year-old student
was shot and killed during a police intervention.
Initially, anarchists mixed with the protesters
with the aim of causing riots targeting police
stations, public buildings and shops. A number
of solidarity demonstrations, some resulting in
violent public disorder, took place in Italy and
Spain.
Austria reports a noticeable decrease in the
level of activities by left-wing groups as a result
of reduced public interest in the Iraq crisis in
2008.86
85 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, UK.
86 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Austria.
8.1. Extremism
In 2008 right-wing extremists organised street
protests, marches, demonstrations or so-called
White Power Music (WPM) concerts in several
EU countries. The member states which report-
ed on right-wing extremists notice that these
groups and individuals maintain contacts with
like-minded people in other countries.87
In the UK, several individuals were arrested for
right-wing extremism. All of these were acting
alone without direction from any known
extreme right-wing group. The extreme right-
wing movement in the UK tends to make its
presence felt less by their own public manifesta-
tions than by counter-protests: most right-wing
street events attracted counter-demonstrations
from anti-fascist groups. Numbers of ANTIFA
protesters have increased in 2008. Extreme
right-wing events are expected to attract similar
counter-protests in 2009.88 (See also chapter on
left-wing terrorism.)
Italy arrested eleven individuals on charges of
right-wing extremism.89
The WPM scene on one side and the auto-
nomous movement on the other constitute the
two poles of political extremism. Whereas polit-
ical extremism is not a tangible threat in
Sweden, certain groups and individuals pose a
threat to individuals and private property, and
to public order and safety. The WPM scene is
composed of groups and networks with right-
wing extremist and racist views whose mem-
bers are prepared to use politically motivated
violence. The autonomous movement consists
of loosely connected networks using a variety of
names to characterise their organisations and
actions. The autonomous movement is split in
35
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87 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, UK.
88 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: UK.
89 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Italy.
Key findings
■ The member states did not report any
right-wing terrorist attacks or arrests 
related to right-wing terrorism for 2008.
All right-wing activities were reported as
extremism.
■ Extreme right-wing activities became 
evident in concerts, demonstrations and
marches.
■ Several member states reported on clashes
between left-wing and right-wing 
extremist groups. Extreme right-wing
events attract counter-protest activity 
from anti-fascist (ANTIFA) groups 
and vice versa.
■ A number of extreme right-wing 
organisations maintain close international
contacts. However, several arrested 
right-wing extremists were acting alone
without links to an extremist organisation.
■ Individual members of the WPM scene
have exhibited their readiness to use 
violence, threats or coercion to reach their
political goals.
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a great number of ideological currents, but anar-
chism, i.e. the elimination of all forms of compul-
sory government, is one of the more widespread
elements. In both the WPM scene and the
autonomous movement, individual members
have exhibited their readiness to use violence,
threats or coercion to reach their political
goals.90
In Belgium, the WPM network Blood & Honour
organised several concerts in 2008. As in previ-
ous years, each of these concerts attracted hun-
dreds of people from all over Europe. Following
a concert in October 2008, the Belgian authori-
ties conducted several searches. Several extrem-
ists were detained during the searches but all
were released afterwards.91
In Austria, right-wing extremist groups were dis-
mantled by the authorities in the 1990s, but
leading members of these groups remain active
at present, mainly in the background. Individual
activists of the revisionist movement make their
presence felt mostly through publications. Right-
wing extremists manifest themselves through
provocative and violent actions. Most of them
are linked to each other in loose networks. Since
2007, however, Austrian right-wing extremists in
some federal states have clearly tried to build up
structures in an attempt to establish a nation-
wide network. In addition, structured and coordi-
nated public manifestations took place in 2008,
in particular in places in which an older genera-
tion of right-wing extremists have had a direct
influence for a prolonged space of time.92
90 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Sweden.
91 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Belgium.
92 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Austria.
Key findings
■ France reported five single issue terrorist
attacks for 2008. The majority of member
states reported single issue activities as
extremism.
■ The majority of animal rights extremism
organisations in the EU are supportive of,
and inspired, by the ideology of Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC).
■ The focus of animal rights extremism 
seems to have shifted from the UK to 
the European mainland in 2008.
Cooperation between animal rights
extremists in Europe has led to 
European-wide extremist activities.
■ Environmental issues are increasingly 
in the focus of single issue extremists.
9.1. Terrorist attacks and
arrested suspects
France reported five single issue terrorism
bomb attacks. Two attacks against speed radars
were claimed by the Fraction Nationaliste Armée
Révolutionnaire (FNAR), while two others were
attributed to them. The FNAR was nothing more
than a one-person organisation. This individual
was arrested on 28 May 2008, after he injured
himself while priming an IED containing home-
made explosives.
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The fifth attack was attributed to the Comité
d’Action Viticole (CAV). This organisation is active
in the south of France and campaigns against
the import of foreign wines.
9.2. Extremism
Activism for animal rights and environmental
issues usually does not take the form of terrorist
offences. Animal rights extremists are more like-
ly to carry out acts of criminal damage, vandal-
ism, intimidation and arson targeting individu-
als linked to companies and academic research.
Belgium, France, Portugal, the Netherlands and
the UK have been affected by arson, while vic-
tims of animal rights extremism (ARE) in Austria,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden
have mostly been affected by systematic harass-
ment; vandalism of fur shops and companies
associated with the contract animal-testing
company Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS); and
the ‘release’ of caged animals such as minks.
The majority of ARE organisations in the EU are
inspired by and support the ideology of the
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC).93 SHAC
targets suppliers, customers and financial insti-
tutions linked to HLS. During the second half of
2008, several British SHAC leaders were found
guilty, among other charges, of having orches-
trated, in 2007, blackmail of companies which
are suppliers of HLS.These trials and convictions
appear to have caused a decrease in ARE activi-
ties in the UK. A number of arrests in January
2008 were also linked to criminal activities by
93 For SHAC's foundation and aims, see TE-SAT 2008, page 40.
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individuals associated with the 2007 SHAC cam-
paign against HLS. The individuals arrested
were experienced animal rights extremists
who are believed to have been responsible for
coordinating the campaign. At the time of writ-
ing, it is difficult to assess how other extremists
will react to the convictions of the SHAC leaders.
In 2008, however, it has become evident that the
SHAC campaign in the UK is fragmenting.
Moreover, there are indications that the UK
authorities’ firm approach to ARE forces these
groups to move to the European mainland in a
view to continue their actions there.94 The Anti-
Dierproeven Coalitie (ADC) is considered to be a
branch of SHAC in Belgium.95
Besides SHAC, the second main animal rights
campaign in the UK in 2008 was Stop Primate
Experiments at Cambridge (SPEAC or SPEAK). It is
protesting against a medical research centre at
Oxford University. SPEAC’s campaigns received a
major blow in November 2008, when one of its
targets, the Oxford University Laboratory, was
officially opened. Although some acts of crimi-
nal damage were reported in early 2008, these
diminished as the year progressed, and there
was little criminal activity in the final quarter of
2008.96
In Austria, animal rights extremists carried out
actions, causing mainly material damages, under
the name of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). A
smaller number of criminal offences occurred
under the acronym SHAC. Austrian animal rights
extremists cooperated with foreign extremists
on different animal rights topics and took part in
European-wide actions.97
In the Netherlands, animal rights extremists
further intensified their activities in the second
half of 2008. Not only the number of criminal
acts increased, but also the intensity and gravi-
ty of the offences seem to have grown. Two
arson attacks on personal property of employ-
ees of the pan-European stock exchange
Euronext in the last weeks of 2008 illustrate
this development. It is possible that Dutch ani-
mal rights extremists are gradually applying
methods that have proven successful in other
countries.98
In the UK, environmentalist protests against the
power sector and airport expansion increased in
2008. Extremists have demonstrated a determi-
nation to take direct action, and there have
been numerous arrests during this period relat-
ed to these causes.
In Sweden, a newly built private house burnt
down in Älmhult in Småland in late July 2008.
Earlier in the same year, the electric wiring of a
building crane near the house and a 3G pylon in
the area were sabotaged. In statements pub-
lished on the Internet the organisation Jordens
befrielsefront (JBF) claimed responsibility for two
of these events. It was the first time that this
name had been used in Sweden, while its inter-
national counterpart, the Earth Liberation Front
(ELF), is well-known. These attacks were intend-
ed to draw attention to environmental issues.99
94 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: UK.
95 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Belgium.
96 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: UK.
97 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Austria.
98 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: the Netherlands.
99 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2009: Sweden.
Due to large fluctuations, a clear trend in the
numbers of failed, foiled and successful terror-
ist attacks cannot be established. The increase
in numbers that was reported in 2007, compared
to 2006, has not continued. During 2008, 515
terrorist attacks were committed in the EU. One
Islamist terrorist attack with the aim to cause
mass casualties caused little damage in the UK.
Separatist terrorist attacks dominate the num-
bers of terrorist incidents in the EU. A total of
397 separatist terrorist attacks were perpetrat-
ed, and 501 suspects were arrested. The vast
majority of attacks and arrests relating to sepa-
ratist terrorism were, as in previous years, report-
ed by France and Spain. Youth organisations
continue to be responsible for the majority of
the attacks in Spain.
The numbers of arrested suspects are rela-
tively independent of the occurrence of ter-
rorist activities. This indicates the existence
of a continuous threat. The majority of the
arrests were carried out on suspicion of mem-
bership of a terrorist organisation. Women con-
tinue to play a minor role in terrorism. The num-
ber of women arrested in relation to separatist,
left-wing and anarchist terrorism is higher than
for Islamist terrorism. The numbers of arrests for
Islamist terrorism, although lower than in the
two previous years, give evidence of the fact
that the threat emanating from individuals and
groups adhering to the ideology of global jihad
remains substantial in some member states.
Successful pro-active activities of law enforce-
ment agencies and intelligence services are usu-
ally not made public.
Islamist terrorists continue to legitimise
their actions with references to western
policies towards Muslims, including the
military presence in conflict zones. Member
states with a military presence in conflict zo-
nes, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, have been
threatened several times during the last years.
Several video statements were released during
the past years.
The threat of terrorism to EU member states
will remain diverse. The EU member states
continue to be confronted with international
organised groups, locally inspired groups and
‘lone wolves’. The Islamist terrorist attack in the
UK in 2008 was carried out by a single offender
– a ‘lone wolf’ – inspired by local extremists.
Other terrorist acts conducted by individuals are
related to single issue terrorism. Although the
arrests of some ETA top leaders may probably
have an impact on ETA’s capabilities in 2009, the
threat from ETA remains serious. In the UK, dissi-
dent Irish republican groups, principally the
RIRA and the CIRA, and other paramilitary
groups may continue to engage in crime and
violence. In France, a single trial for separatist
terrorism involved 18 defendants. In Belgium,
five members of a group related to the first
European female suicide bomber were tried
jointly. Both cases are illustrative of terrorists
acting in groups. Extremist groups of both left-
wing and right-wing orientation are known to
entertain international contacts.
The number of persons associated with
‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorist groups is
rising in the EU. Reasons for this include that
members of terrorist cells acting outside the
organisational framework of mosques have
largely replaced ‘radical imams’ in Islamist ter-
rorist recruitment. Prisons and other places
where people are vulnerable are being used for
recruitment and radicalisation.
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EU–based suspects will continue providing
logistical support to Islamist terrorist groups
and networks based outside the EU. Member
states continue to report that their country may
be used as a logistical base for terrorist groups
active outside the EU. Some member states on
the eastern border of the EU are still at risk of
being used as transit countries for terrorists in
order to reach other parts of the EU.
Target selection remains dependant on the
political or ideological goals of the groups or
individuals concerned. Islamist terrorists aim
at causing indiscriminate mass casualties.
Corsican separatist terrorist groups continue to
target mainly private property or individuals,
while Basque separatist terrorist groups mainly
execute attacks against business and govern-
mental targets. Left-wing and anarchist terror-
ists mainly focus on exponents of capitalist soci-
ety and on traditional institutions such as busi-
ness and (inter)governmental targets.
Activities related to financing of terrorism,
carried out inside or outside the EU, continue
to be dependent on the procurement of
funds by supporting groups in the member
states. All terrorist organisations need to raise
funds, regardless how small the proceeds. Illegal
sources for the funding of terrorism appear to
cover a wide range of criminal activities, span-
ning from fraud and counterfeit to burglary, kid-
napping and extortion. Funds are also derived
from legitimate sources. Islamist and non-
Islamist terrorist groups use different methods
of financing. Islamist groups generate more
money than non-Islamist groups.
The Internet continues to be a factor which
greatly facilitates the activities of terrorist
groups. Websites, weblogs and forums are used
by terrorist groups of all affiliations for tailor-
made propaganda and communication. The
year 2008 has witnessed an increase in Islamist
extremist websites in western languages as part
of a strategy to reach western audiences. Groups
associated with separatist terrorism use the
Internet for claiming attacks. Left-wing, right-
wing and single issue terrorist groups use the
Internet as a medium to announce manifesta-
tions, such as demonstrations and concerts.
Activities by left-wing and anarchist terror-
ists and extremists are increasing in quantity
and geographical spread in the EU. In Greece,
the use of violence by the Epanastatikos Agonas
or Revolutionary Struggle has escalated and has
the potential for further escalation. Left-wing
and anarchist groups are increasingly establish-
ing links across the EU. Most of their actions
reflect a common agenda.
Right-wing and single issue terrorism is a rel-
atively minor factor in the EU. There were no
right-wing and only five instances of single issue
terrorist activities in the EU in 2008. The inci-
dents were almost exclusively regarded as the
acts of extremists rather than terrorists. Animal
rights extremism (ARE) predominated the illegal
activities of single issue terrorism. Animal rights
extremists are shifting their focus from the UK to
the European mainland. The most stringent ARE
campaigns in the EU are inspired by and sup-
port the ideology of the Europe-wide Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC).
Home-made explosives remain the type most
used to carry out attacks. As in the previous
years, home-made explosives remain the type of
explosive most frequently used to carry out
attacks. The bomb prepared for the attack in the
UK contained home-made explosives. The
decreasing trend that started in 2007 in the use
of commercial explosives in ETA attacks contin-
ued in 2008. In their place, home-made explosives
were used. Also the majority of left-wing and
anarchist attacks involve the use of home-made
explosives.
The security situation outside the EU contin-
ues to have an impact on member states.
Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to have replaced
Iraq as preferred destinations for volunteers
wishing to engage in armed conflict. Since 2007,
Somalia has also become an important destina-
tion for foreign fighters. The number of fighters
returning from these regions is likely to in-
crease. In Turkey, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL is
involved in a struggle for political and cultural
autonomy for the Kurdish population. This is
reflected in non-violent activities and propa-
ganda work in Germany and other European
countries.
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Annex 1: Acronyms
ADC Anti-Dierproeven Coalitie 
Anti-Animal Testing Coalition
ALF Animal Liberation Front
ANTIFA Anti-fascist groups
ANV Acción Nacionalista Vasca 
Basque Nationalist Action
APAPC Association des Parents et Amis des Prisonniers Communistes – Secours Rouge
Association of Parents and Friends of Communist Prisoners – Red Aid
AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
Tanzim al-qa’ida bi-bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami
ARE Animal Rights Extremism
CAV Comité d’Action Viticole 
Committee for Viticultural Action
CCC Cellules Communistes Combattantes 
Communist Combatant Cells
CIRA Continuity Irish Republican Army
DHKP-C Devrimci Halk Kurtulus¸ Partisi/Cephesi 
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front
ELF Earth Liberation Front
ETA Euskadi ta Askatasuna 
Basque Fatherland and Liberty 
EU European Union
FAI Federazione Anarchia Informale 
Informal Anarchist Federation
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FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FLNC-22 Octobre Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse du 22 Octobre 
National Front for the Liberation of Corsica of 22 October
FLNC-UDC Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse - Union des Combattants 
National Front for the Liberation of Corsica - Union of Combatants
FNAR Fraction Nationaliste Armée Revolutionnaire 
Armed Nationalist Revolutionary Faction
GIMF Global Islamic Media Front 
al-Jabha al-i‘lamiyya al-Islamiyya al-‘alamiyya
GRAPO Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre  
Anti-fascist Resistance Groups October First
GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat 
al-Jama’a al-salafiyya lil-da’wa wal-qital 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
IED Improvised explosive device
IJU Islamic Jihad Union
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INLA Irish National Liberation Army 
IRC International Rescue Committee
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JBF Jordens befrielsefront 
Earth Liberation Front
KONGRA-GEL Kongra Gelê Kurdistan 
People's Congress of Kurdistan
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
PCP-M Partito Comunista Politico-Militare
PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army
PKK Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan 
Kurdistan Workers' Party
RIRA Real Irish Republican Army
SHAC Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
SitCen European Union Joint Situation Centre
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SPEAC/SPEAK Stop Primate Experiments at Cambridge
TE-SAT European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
TWP Terrorism Working Party of the EU Council
VBIED Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
WPM White power music
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Annex 2: Excerpt from the
Council Framework Decision
on combating terrorism
According to Article 1 of the Council Framework
Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terror-
ism (2002/475/JHA), terrorist offences are inten-
tional acts which, given their nature or context,
may seriously damage a country or an interna-
tional organisation where committed.
Terrorist offences are committed with the aim of 
• seriously intimidating a population, or
• unduly compelling a government or interna-
tional organisation to perform or abstain
from performing an act, or 
• seriously destabilising or destroying the fun-
damental political, constitutional, economic
or social structures of a country or an inter-
national organisation.
Terrorist offences include 
1. attacks upon a person’s life which may cause
death;
2. attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
3. kidnapping or hostage taking;
4. causing extensive destruction to a govern-
ment or a public facility, a transport system,
an infrastructure facility, including an infor-
mation system, a fixed platform located on
the continental shelf, a public place or pri-
vate property likely to endanger human life
or result in major economic loss;
5. seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of
public or goods transport;
6. manufacture, possession, acquisition, trans-
port, supply or use of weapons, explosives or
of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons,
as well as research into and development of
biological and chemical weapons;
7. release of dangerous substances, or causing
fires, floods or explosions the effect of which
is to endanger human life;
8. interfering with or disrupting the supply of
water, power or any other fundamental natu-
ral resource the effect of which is to endan-
ger human life;
9. threatening to commit any of the acts listed
above.
Article 2, paragraph 2, obliges the member
states to take the necessary measures to ensure
that directing a terrorist group and participating
in its activities, including by supplying informa-
tion or material resources or by funding its activ-
ities, are punishable.
Article 3 obliges the member states to take the
necessary measures to ensure that terrorist-
linked offences include aggravated theft, extor-
tion and drawing up false administrative docu-
ments with a view to commit certain terrorist
offences.
According to Article 4, inciting or aiding or abet-
ting offences referred to in the Framework
Decision should also be made punishable.
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Annex 3: Implementation of
the EU Framework Decision
on combating terrorism 
in the member states which 
provided Eurojust with 
information on convictions
Belgium
At the start of 2007, a Royal Decree entered into
force making it easier for the financial adminis-
trative authorities to freeze the assets of individ-
uals involved in terrorist offences, as described
in the 19 December 2003 Act on Terrorism. A
second new bill was published on 15 May 2007
on the insurance against damage caused by
terrorist acts. This new law supports the victim
of a terrorist act in receiving compensation.
Also, a Royal Decree of October 2006 entered
into force on 15 June 2007, allowing a check of
financial transactions, in order to fight money
laundering and financing of terrorism.
Denmark
After the introduction of the first anti-terrorism
package on 31 May 2002, the Danish Parlia-
ment passed an updated package on 2 June
2006. In the Criminal Code, the definition of the
concept of terrorism has been laid down in
Section 114. Recruitment for terrorism, as well
as training, instruction and teaching have been
criminalised in Sections 114c and 114d. Aiding
and abetting to terrorism is punishable with up
to six years in prison according to Section
114d. Through amendments to the Administra-
tion of Justice Act, investigative powers have
now been strengthened for both the police
and the intelligence service. The amendment in
2006 also allowed a less restricted access to ex-
change of information between the Security
Intelligence Service and the Defence Intelli-
gence Service. In September 2007, a new provi-
sion of the Administration of Justice Act
entered into force, allowing for the storage of
Internet and telecommunications data for an
one-year period.
Finland
Four new significant amendments related to ter-
rorist crimes came into force on 1 May 2008 in
Finland concerning
1. public incitement to terrorist offences;
2. providing training for a terrorist group;
3. promoting the activity of a terrorist group;
4. recruiting persons for terrorist offences.
France
Since 9 September 1986, the French law has pro-
vided for the possibility that the prosecution,
investigation and judgement of terrorist
offences take place in Paris. In practice, all ter-
rorist cases are centralised in Paris. Since then,
the French legislation concerning incrimination
of terrorist acts (including financing of terror-
ism) as well as rules governing the criminal pro-
ceeding have been regularly amended, most
recently in January 2006. Terrorist acts are
defined by Articles 421-1 to 422-7 of the Penal
Code. French law refers in particular to existing
offences that are qualified as terrorist acts
“where they are committed intentionally in con-
nection with an individual or collective under-
taking the purpose of which is seriously to dis-
turb public order through intimidation or ter-
ror”. The law also provides for the participation
in a group or association in order to prepare any
act of terrorism. Concerning the criminal pro-
ceedings, it should be noted that, since 2004,
specific provisions have applied to terrorist
offences. They mainly concern surveillance, infil-
tration, custody, searches, interception of
telecommunications, audio and video recording
in specified vehicles and places, and measures
to freeze property.
Germany
At the end of 2003, the Criminal Code was
updated to implement the 2002 Council
Framework Decision. In September 2007, new
provisions in criminal law were proposed to
extend the criminalisation of preparatory terror-
ist acts (falling under Sections 129 a and b of the
Criminal Code), and punish with up to ten years
in prison instead of six months. With these pro-
posals, training and receiving of training will be
criminalised. Also, the manufacturing or posses-
sion of weapons or fluids and gasses which can
be used for preparing to commit terrorist acts
will be criminalised. A further provision will be
introduced criminalising incitement to terrorism
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on the Internet and penalising this crime with
up to three years in prison.
Greece
Article 187a of the Greek Criminal Code contains
some of the provisions implementing the
Council Framework Decision. In this section,
threats to commit terrorist acts are criminalised,
when they are serious enough and cause terror.
Also, the setting up and membership of a struc-
tured organisation of more than three persons,
acting together and planning to commit terror-
ist acts is made punishable with up to ten years’
imprisonment. Article 187 provides that perpe-
tration of the acts mentioned in article 187a
may carry up to a life sentence. After serving 25
years, the convicted person can be released
from prison on the basis of article 105 of the
Criminal Procedure Code. Special investigation
techniques are allowed under article 253a of the
Criminal Procedure Code. Prosecutions on the
basis of article 187a are brought before the
Council of the Court of Appeal.
Republic of Ireland
Terrorist acts are prosecuted under the Offences
Against the State Acts 1939 to 1998, in combina-
tion with the Criminal Justice (Terrorist
Offences) Act 2005. The Criminal Justice Act
2005 provides for Ireland’s compliance with the
Council Framework Decision of 2002. The
Offences Against the State Acts provide,
amongst others, for the offences of membership
of, providing assistance to, and directing an
unlawful organisation. The Criminal Justice Act
strengthens the possibilities to deal with inter-
national terrorism and regulates that groups
that engage in, promote or encourage the com-
mission of a terrorist activity are unlawful organ-
isations under the Offences Against the State
Acts. Terrorist offences are tried at the Special
Criminal Court which was established under the
Offences Against the State Acts.
Italy
Terrorism is defined under Article 270 of the
Criminal Code; the definition dates back to 1980.
An amendment in 2001 extended the definition
of terrorism to include violence against interna-
tional organisations and foreign states. On 31
July 2005, a new definition and new offences
(such as recruitment and training) were intro-
duced reflecting elements of the Council
Framework Decision of 2002. New measures to
prevent and combat financing of terrorism were
introduced in 2007, according to Directive
2005/60/CE. On 29 December, new measures
concerning expulsion in case of terrorism were
adopted.
Luxembourg
On 29 July 2008, Luxembourg has ratified the
International Convention for the repression of
Nuclear Terrorism of 14 September 2005 and has
introduced specific criminal sanctions in case of
violation.
Slovenia
In 2008 the new Slovenian Penal Code was
adopted, coming into force on 1 November
2008. The new Penal Code amends the provi-
sions regarding terrorism in the previous Penal
Code and adds some new provisions taking into
account the content of the Framework Decision
on combating terrorism and its recent amend-
ments. Articles 108, 109, 110 and 111 contain
provisions with regard to terrorism, financing of
terrorist activities, incitement and public glorifi-
cation of terrorist activities, conscripting and
training for terrorist activities, respectively.
Spain
In October 2007, the government of Spain
passed a law in accordance with the Directive
2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 15 March 2006: Law 25/2007 on
Electronic Communications. The object of the
law is the regulation of the providers of public
electronic communications services (fixed net-
work telephony, mobile telephony and Internet)
concerning their obligations with respect to the
retention of data while providing a service, as
well as the possibility to make that data avail-
able to the persons in charge of an investigation
(with the permission of a judicial authority). The
law will apply to the traffic and localisation of
both legal entities and natural persons and to
the related data necessary to identify the sub-
scriber and registered user. It will not apply to
the content of the electronic communications
or to the information consulted using an elec-
tronic communications network. The provider
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will have to keep the data for a year, with a pos-
sibility to extend the period to two years or to
reduce it to six months. The companies had six
months after this law has entered into force (7
November 2007) to prepare the equipment
required to comply with the law.
Sweden
The Swedish government has, during 2008, put
forward a proposal to the Swedish Parliament
that Sweden would approve the changes in the
European Council Framework Decision of 13
June 2002 on combating terrorism. This means
that Sweden in the future has to criminalise
public exhortation of terrorism, recruiting for
the purpose of terrorism and training for the
purpose of terrorism.
The Netherlands
A bill allowing increased possibilities for inves-
tigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes
came into force on 1 February 2007. The new
law penalises the establishment of a terrorist
organisation, as well as participation to or lead-
ership of a terrorist organisation. Conspiracy to
commit terrorist crimes and recruitment for the
jihad is also specifically criminalised. Further
preventive measures have been introduced in
the criminal procedure law. On the basis of a
Decision on investigation of terrorist offences,
of the same date, further executive measures
may be proscribed by special legislation.
Finally, at the end of 2006, a new bill was intro-
duced allowing witnesses protected by the
intelligence services to testify in court, thus
facilitating the use of intelligence materials in
terrorism proceedings.
United Kingdom
The UK is one of the countries where anti-ter-
rorism legislation has been in place for many
years. The Terrorism Act of 30 March 2006 put
in place a number of new offences, including
preparatory acts, training, encouragement to
terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publi-
cations. In 2007 new proposals were put for-
ward to change the counter-terrorism legisla-
tion. The main elements proposed in the new
bill are: a possible extension of pre-charge
detention for terrorist suspects beyond the
current limit of 28 days; a requirement for con-
victed terrorists to provide the police with per-
sonal information on their release from prison
and to notify any changes to this information;
introduction of a foreign travel order that will
enable convicted terrorists to be banned from
travelling overseas; changes to enable post-
charge questioning of terrorist suspects and
the drawing of adverse inferences from a re-
fusal to say something that is later relied on in
court; enhanced sentences for those convicted
of terrorism-related offences; putting the police
counter-terrorist DNA database on a sound
statutory footing and making other changes to
enable the full use of DNA in terrorist cases.
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Annex 4: Number of failed, foiled or successful attacks in
2006, 2007 and 2008 per member state and per affiliation100
100 The UK provided Europol with information on a total number of 74 attacks in 2008, without specification of the
type of terrorism. Unlike previous editions of the TE-SAT, this number also includes attacks carried out in Northern
Ireland.
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Annex 5: Number of arrested suspects in 2006, 2007 and 2008
per member state and per affiliation101
101 The UK provided Europol with information on a total of 256 arrests in 2008, without specifying the affiliation of
those arrested. Unlike previous editions of the TE-SAT, this number also includes arrests carried out in Northern
Ireland.
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